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THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE AGE
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) t
prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of age against
employees between the ages of forty and seventy years in connection
with hiring practices, job retention, compensation, and other terms and
conditions of employment.2 Originally applicable only to private em-
ployers with twenty-five or more employees,3 the ADEA was expanded
by the enactment of the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974
(FLSA amendments) 4 to include protection for employees of a state or
state political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality. The ADEA was
enacted pursuant to the commerce clause,5 based on findings that "ar-
bitrary discrimination in employment because of age, burdens com-
merce and the free flow of goods in commerce. ' 6
The constitutionality of the ADEA as applied to the states was put
in issue as a result of the 1976 Supreme Court decision of National
League of Cities v. Usery,7 in which the Court determined that the
FLSA amendments were unconstitutional insofar as they extended the
statutory minimum wage and maximum hours provisions of the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA)8 to employees of states and state political
subdivisions.9 The Court invalidated such amendments on the grounds
that they operated "to directly displace the States' freedom to structure
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a)(1), 631(a) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 230(d) (1940).
4. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. (1976 & Supp. III 1979)). The FLSA amendments
expanded the definition of "employer" in the ADEA to include "a State or political subdivision of
a State and any agency or instrumentality of a State or a political subdivision of a State, and any
interstate agency, but such term does not include the United States, or a corporation wholly owed
by the Government of the United States." 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1976). The amendments also
incorporated the states and state entities into the definition of "employer" contained within the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, thereby extending minimum wage and maximum hours protec-
tion to state employees. See infra note 8.
5. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. "The Congress shall have Power. . To regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes ..
6. 29 U.S.C. § 621(a)(4) (1976).
7. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
8. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
9. 426 U.S. at 852. Although the FLSA amendments extended both the FLSA and ADEA
to the states, National League of Cities reviewed only the extension of the FLSA.
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integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions." 10
As a result, congressional authority under the commerce clause was im-
plicitly held to be limited by the reserve powers granted to the states
under the tenth amendment." Whether Congress exceeded its author-
ity under the commerce clause by utilizing the same amendments to
apply the ADEA to the states remained unanswered, as the Court did
not face the issue of the constitutionality of the FLSA amendments in-
sofar as they extended other acts to states and their political
subdivisions.
Subsequent lower court decisions dealing with that issue have
unanimously upheld the validity of the ADEA as applied to the
states.12 A vast majority of those courts, however, has sidestepped the
federalism issue by finding that the ADEA was passed pursuant to the
enforcement power of the fourteenth amendment, 3 not pursuant to the
commerce clause. The preference for such analysis is based in part on
historical recognition of the fourteenth amendment as a limitation of
state sovereignty, the logical implication of which is that legislation
properly passed pursuant to the amendment's enforcement provision is
unlikely to encounter federalism as a basis for invalidation. 4 By
10. 426 U.S. at 852. National League of Cities was the first case since Carter v. Carter Coal
Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936), in which the Supreme Court invalidated congressional legislation regu-
lating commerce on federalism grounds.
11. U.S. CONsT. amend. X states: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people."
12. See Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267, 1271 (4th Cir. 1977); Carpenter v. Pennsylvania
Liquor Control Bd., 508 F. Supp. 148, 149-50 (E.D. Pa. 1981); EEOC v. Calumet County, 26 Fair
EmpI. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 20, 25-26 (E.D. Wis. 1981); Johnson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 26 Fair
EmpI. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 44,47-49 (D. Md. 1981); Marshall v. Delaware River & Bay Auth., 471 F.
Supp. 886, 891-93 (D. Del. 1979); EEOC v. Florrissant Valley Fire Dist., 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 973, 975 (E.D. Mo. 1979); Marshall v. City of Philadelphia, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 869, 870 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Remmick v. Barnes County, 435 F. Supp. 914, 916 (D.N.D.
1977); Aaron v. Davis, 424 F. Supp. 1238, 1241 (E.D. Ark. 1976); Usery v. Board of Educ., 421 F.
Supp. 718, 721 (D. Utah 1976).
13. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws .... The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appro-
priate legislation, the provisions of this article.
14. See, e.g., Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880), which states the proposition succinctly:
The prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment are directed to the States, and they are
to a degree restrictions of State power. It is these which Congress is empowered to en-
force, and to enforce against State action, however put forth, whether that action be
executive, legislative, or judicial. Such enforcement is no invasion of State sovereignty.
Id at 346; accord Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976):
In [section 5 of the fourteenth amendment] Congress is expressly granted authority to
enforce "by appropriate legislation" the substantive provision of the Fourteenth Amend-
19821
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avoiding commerce power analysis, the lower courts were able to cir-
cumvent the principles set forth in NationalLeague of Cities. In exam-
ining the constitutionality of the ADEA as applied to the states, this
Comment will suggest that proper analysis of the ADEA excludes con-
sideration of Congress' enforcement power and is limited to its com-
merce power. Such analysis illustrates the likelihood that the ADEA
will be declared invalid on grounds initially established in National
League of Cities.
I. THE NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES RATIONALE
Inquiry into the constitutionality of the ADEA as applied to the
states properly begins with an analysis of the principles established in
National League of Cities. That case expressly overruled Maryland v.
Wirtz, 5 in which the Supreme Court upheld an amendment to the
FLSA16 which extended its wage and hour provisions to state and local
government employees of health care and-educational institutions and
local transit operations. In Wirtz, the majority found untenable the
argument that the Act interfered with "sovereign state functions.' 7
However, Justice Douglas, whose arguments were later adopted by the
majority in NationalLeague of Cities, 1  stated in his dissenting opinion
in Wirtz, "what is done here is . . . such a serious invasion of state
sovereignty protected by the Tenth Amendment that it is in my view
not consistent with our constitutional federalism."19
ment, which themselves embody significant limitations on state authority. When Con-
gress acts pursuant to § 5, not only is it exercising legislative authority that is plenary
within the terms of the constitutional grant, it is exercising that authority under one
section of a constitutional Amendment whose other sections by their own terms embody
limitations on state authority.
Id at 456.
15. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
16. Fair Labor Standard Amendment of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, 80 Stat. 830-832, 837
(currently codified at 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(5) (1976 & Supp. III 1979)).
17. 392 U.S. at 193. Justice Harlan asserted that there was no rule keeping the two govern-
ments-national and state-from interfering with each other. Id at 195. The Court further stated
that, "[i]f a state is engaging in economic activities that are validly regulated by the Federal Gov-
ernment when engaged in by private persons, the state too may be forced to conform its activities
to federal regulation." Id at 197.
18. The NationalLeague of Cities opinion was written by Justice Rehnquist, who was joined
by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and Powell. Justice Blackmun filed a
concurring opinion.
19. 392 U.S. at 201 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas recognized Congress' ability to
encroach incidentally upon state sovereignty in the regulation of interstate commerce, but drew
the line at disruption of fiscal policy in areas traditionally regulated by the states. Cited examples
of federal regulations whose infringement on state sovereignty were held to be permissible include
the Federal Employer's Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1976) (imposed on state-owned rail-
roads), held constitutional in Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 192 (1964); the Safety Appli-
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The extension of the FLSA to virtually all state and local govern-
ment employers in 1974 set the stage for National League of Cities. In
an opinion written by Justice Rehnquist, the Court held that the 1974
amendments impermissibly operated directly on "the States qua
States" 20 to displace state policy choices with the policy decisions of
Congress. Justice Rehnquist noted that federalism acts as a limit on
Congress' ability to utilize the commerce clause when legislation sub-
stantially restructures "traditional ways with which local governments
have arranged their affairs."21
It is one thing to recognize the authority of Congress to enact
laws regulating individual businesses necessarily subject to
the dual sovereignty of the government of the Nation and of
the State in which they reside. It is quite another to uphold a
similar exercise of congressional authority directed, not to pri-
vate citizens, but to the States as States. We have repeatedly
recognized that there are attributes of sovereignty attaching to
every state government which may not be impaired by Con-
gress, not because Congress may lack an affirmative grant of
legislative authority to reach the matter, but because the Con-
stitution prohibits it from exercising the authority in that
manner.
22
The majority characterized congressional infringement on state
sovereignty in this instance as two-fold. First, Congress was mandating
a financial burden to be placed directly on the states. "Judged solely in
terms of increased costs in dollars," the FLSA had "a significant impact
on the functioning of the governmental bodies involved."2 3 Second,
ance Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-43 .(1976) (imposed on state-owned railroads), held constitutional in
United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 185 (1936); TariffAct of 1922, 19 U.S.C. § 121 (repealed
1930) (imposed federal customs duties on state universities for importation of educational equip-
ment), held constitutional in Board of Trustees v. United States, 289 U.S. 48, 58 (1933); Act of
June 28, 1938, ch. 795, 52 Stat. 1215 (1938) (Congress was allowed to condemn 100,000 acres of
state land to build a reservoir, Oklahoma v. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 534 (1941)); Act of Mar.
3, 1899, ch. 425 § 10, 30 Stat. 1121, 1151 (1899) (a state was prohibited from diverting water from
the Great Lakes necessary to ensure navigability, Sanitary Dist. v. United States, 266 U.S. 405,
426 (1925)).
20. 426 U.S. at 847.
21. Id at 849.
22. Id at 845.
23. Id. at 846. Congress can properly impose financial obligations on the states by utilizing
"conditional spending" under the spending power. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8. For example, it is well
established that Congress can financially reward a state for its participation in a selected program.
See Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 143 (1947); Helvering v. Davis,
301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 598 (1937); United States v.
Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 61-62 (1936). The Court has avoided the federalism problems inherent in
conditional spending by asserting that there is no infringement on sovereignty when a state know-
ingly avails itself of the financial burden and can revoke the agreement at any time. Thus, a state
1982]
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the Court recognized Congress' usurpation of state discretion on "con-
sidered policy choices"24 in the delivery of state and local services. As
noted by Justice Rehnquist, "[q]uite apart from the substantial costs
imposed upon the States and their political subdivisions, the Act dis-
places state policies regarding the manner in which they will structure
delivery of those governmental services which their citizens require. ' 25
Once it established the general premise that Congress cannot im-
pose upon the states in the manner provided by the FLSA, the Court
next attempted to offer guidance on those infringements on state sover-
eignty that are serious enough to render legislation invalid. The Court
implicitly suggested a direct/indirect test for deciding the validity of
future congressional action taken under the guise of the commerce
power. Under this test, Congress cannot utilize the power "so as to
force directly upon the States its choices as to how essential decisions
regarding the conduct of integral governmental functions [were] to be
made."26 The Court gave no further guidance on the use of this test to
determine whether other legislation might impermissibly infringe on
state sovereignty.
In contrast to the direct/indirect test, Justice Blackmun, in a con-
curring opinion, described the majority's decision as a "balancing ap-
proach."'27 Under such analysis, Congress can legitimately impose its
is protected from unwanted federal interference with its integral operations. See Steward Mach.
Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 584, 587 (1937) (majority required that the condition not be linked to
an irrevocable agreement, not operate without the approval of the state, and not be directed to-
ward the attainment of an unlawful end). Conditional spending, however, can be a threat to
federalism when there is little opportunity for uninfluenced decision-making by state legislators.
This occurs where congressional grants so influence a state that it voluntarily allows the federal
government to usurp its traditional functions. Lenient judicial standards that allow such coercion
frustrate the purposes of federalism and theoretically provide an outlet for Congress to re-enact
legislation found unconstitutional under other powers. Thus, if the ADEA was found unconstitu-
tional under the commerce clause, it could be re-enacted under the spending clause and adopted
by states on a "voluntary" basis, thus defeating the goals of federalism. See generally Comment,
Taking Federalism Seriously: Limiting State Acceptance of National Grants, 90 YALE L.J. 1694
(1981).
24. 426 U.S. at 848.
25. Id at 847. The policy choices listed by the Court included a state's decision to hire
temporary personnel, persons with little or no training, or teenagers for summer employment.
Although the Court avoids including employment of the aged in this list, it clearly establishes
hiring practices as a prerogative of the state.
26. Id at 855 (emphasis added). The direct/indirect test utilizes the basic theory asserted by
Justice Douglas in his dissenting opinion in Maryland v. Wirtz. See supra notes 15-19 and accom-
panying text.
27. 426 U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun expressly stated that he
joined the other four justices to comprise a majority only because he understood their opinion as
one allowing legislation responding to a strong national need to act as an exception to the general
rule that enjoins federal legislation enacted pursuant to the commerce power from infringing on
5
Love: The Unconstitutionality of the Age Discrimination in Employment A
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1981
8 AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
will upon the states when asserting a paramount federal interest, even
though the legislation would otherwise be forbidden by the National
League of Cities rationale.28 This interpretation of the majority opi-
ion seems correct in light of the majority's own reservations. For exam-
ple, Justice Rehnquist explicitly distinguished Fry v. United States29 in
which the Court upheld the validity of the Economic Stabilization Act
of 1970 (ESA)3° which temporarily froze the wages of state and local
government employees." Initially, the ESA appears to resemble the
invalidated FLSA amendments which also sought to regulate wages of
state and local government employees. However, Justice Rehnquist re-
affirmed the holding of Fry and emphasized the national need for im-
mediate action, in the form of the ESA, because of the then-existing
emergency economic conditions.32 Furthermore, because of the limited
duration of the ESA, interference with states' rights was considered
mild. Finally, in freezing the wages of state employees, the federal leg-
islation upheld in Fry was viewed as enacted to relieve fiscal burdens
on the states rather than increasing them as the FLSA amendments did.
Thus, if Fry is indicative of an instance when a paramount federal in-
terest would render legislation valid despite its infringements on state
sovereignty, then it is clear that the Court intended the "paramount
federal interest" exception to be severely limited.
II. IMPLICATIONS OF NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES
A. The Hodel Decision
National League of Cities came "to symbolize the Burger Court's
concern for the rights of states in the federal system."33 Yet Justice
Rebnquist's opinion did little to clarify just how far the Court was will-
ing to go in upholding states' rights.34 Such clarification came in the
state sovereignty. In this way, his opinion represents "the lowest common denominator" of the
majority's holding.
28. Justice Blackmun used "environmental protection" as his sole example of an instance
where the federal interest would outweigh the state interest even after federal infringements on
traditional state functions were proved. Id
29. 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
30. Title II of the Act of Aug. 15, 1970, 12 U.S.C. § 1904. (The Act was extended five times
before it expired on April 30, 1974.)
31. 421 U.S. at 548.
32. 426 U.S. at 853.
33. Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism aedAfflnnative R ights
to Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L. Rav. 1065, 1065 (1977).
34. A trend toward increased emphasis on states' rights was initiated prior to NationalLeague
of Cities. See, e.g., Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975); Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. 651, 673-74 (1974); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 50-51 (1971).
1982]
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recent case of Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mineral & Reclamation Associa-
tion.35 In Hodel, Justice Marshall stipulated three criteria that must be
satisfied before congressional legislation can be invalidated. In so do-
ing, the Court reaffirmed the principles behind the reasoning of Na-
tional League of Cities. The first requirement is "a showing that the
challenged statutes regulates the 'States as States.' "36 In addition, the
federal regulation must "address matters that are indisputably 'attrib-
utes of state sovereignty.' -3 Finally, "it must be apparent that the
States' compliance with the federal law would directly impair their
ability 'to structure integral operations in areas of traditional
functions.' ",38
Unlike the FLSA as applied to the states, the legislation facing the
Court in Hodel, the steep-slope provisions of the Surface Mining Con-
trol and Reclamation Act of 1977,39 was found to be a legitimate exer-
cise of the commerce power. The Act imposed mining performance
standards on coal mine operations, and the steep-slope provisions re-
quired operators to restore a mining site to its approximate original
contour. The plaintiffs claimed that these provisions impermissibly dis-
placed state policy choices concerning the regulation of land-a com-
modity that does not move in interstate commerce. The Court rejected
this assertion, concluding that under the provisions of the Act, a state
was allowed the option of submitting for the Secretary of Interior's ap-
proval a proposed permanent program that met the federal minimum
standards, or alternatively, adopting the federal program with the costs
of regulation to be borne by the federal government. Because of this
option, the Act did not directly compel states to participate in the regu-
latory program, to enforce the standards of the Act, or to expend any
state funds. Furthermore, the Court found that the Act regulated only
private industry, and not the states as states. Accordingly, the Court
held that mere displacement of state laws regulating private activity did
not constitute direct regulation of the states themselves.40 Thus, the
35. 101 S. Ct. 2352 (1981).
36. Id at 2366 (quoting 426 U.S. at 854).
37. Id (quoting 426 U.S. at 845).
38. Id (quoting 426 U.S. at 852). However, it appears that fulfillment of such factors does
not necessarily guarantee the success of a tenth amendment challenge to federal legislation in light
of the Court's statement, that "[t]here are situations in which the nature of the federal interest
advanced may be such that it justifies State submission." Id. at 2366 n.29 (citations omitted),
Such language resembles the balancing test urged by Justice Blackmun in National League of
Cities. See supra text accompanying notes 27 and 28.
39. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (Supp. III 1979),
40. 101 S. Ct. at 2366.
[Vol. 17:782
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Act was not found violative of state sovereignty in the manner forbid-
den by National League of Cities.
Although at first glance Hodel appears to restrict states' rights, the
Court's unanimous reaffirmation of the principles established in Na-
tionalLeague of Cities makes it an essential element of federalism anal-
ysis. Specifically, Hodel emphasized the tenets fatal to the
constitutionality of the ADEA as applied to the states. Using these ten-
ets, it is appropriate at this point to review the commerce power analy-
sis utilized by the lower courts in uniformly rejecting constitutional
challenges to the ADEA as applied to state and local governments.4'
B. Treatment of the ADEA by the Lower Courts
Only one of the lower courts addressing the issue of the constitu-
tionality of the ADEA as applied to the states, Usery v. Board of Educa-
tion42 has attempted to justify the Act on the basis of Congress'
commerce power. In doing so, the court did not discuss the three objec-
tive requirements asserted by Justice Marshall in Hodel. Instead, the
Board of Education court moved directly to the more subjective test of
balancing the state and federal interests as prescribed by Justice Black-
mun in NationalLeague of Cities and concluded that the national inter-
est in employment significantly outweighed the states' interest in
discriminatory employment policies and practices.43 The Court failed,
however, to adequately distinguish National League of Cities, in which
the Court found that the states' interest in avoiding the FLSA out-
weighed the national need for its implementation. The states' interest
therein was the desire to retain state sovereignty and integrity and to
provide traditional governmental services in the most efficient and eco-
nomical manner. That interest remains unchanged when the chal-
lenged legislation is the ADEA, contrary to the Board of Education
court's description of the state interest therein as the preservation of
employment discrimination. Thus, the only variable upon which to
distinguish the holding in Board of Education from that in National
League of Cities is the nature of the federal legislation involved. In
other words, only if the federal interest in achieving state employment
for the aged (ADEA) was found to be substantially greater than the
federal interest in maintaining minimum wages and maximum hours
41. See supra note 12.
42. 421 F. Supp. 718 (D. Utah 1976).
43. Id at 720.
1982]
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for all state employees (FLSA) could Board of Education be reconciled
with NationalLeague of Cities. Such a comparison was not made. Nor
did the Board of Education court even attempt to demonstrate with spe-
cific examples the degree and scope of the federal interest in eliminat-
ing state employment discrimination against the aged. Federalism, the
underlying principle used in National League of Cities to invalidate the
FLSA amendments, was not treated by the Board ofEducation court as
anything but an analytical stumbling block. The court simply stated its
conclusions, unsupported by analogy or evidence.
The remainder of the lower courts which have considered the issue
concluded that similarities between the ADEA and title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964" indicated that Congress was utilizing its enforce-
ment power under the fourteenth amendment when it passed the
ADEA.4 5 The courts' insistence on analyzing the ADEA under the en-
forcement power instead of the commerce power seems unusual in light
of Congress' implicit reliance on the commerce clause in the text of the
Act.46 Such insistence indicates the courts' recognition of constitutional
difficulties with the ADEA as enacted under the commerce power.
C. Treatment of the EPA by the Lower Courts
Lower courts reviewing the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (EPA)47 have
used the same constitutional analysis as those considering the validity
of the ADEA. The EPA is similar to the ADEA in that both acts regu-
44. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976).
45. See infra notes 82-84 and accompanying text. The court in Remmick v. Barnes County,
435 F. Supp. 914 (D.N.D. 1977), however, acknowledged in a footnote the Board of Education
court's balancing of state and federal interests pursuant to commerce power analysis. Id at 916-
17 n.3.
46. See supra notes 5 & 6 and accompanying text.
47. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall discrimi-
nate, within any establishment in which such employees are employed, between employ-
ees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such establishment at a rate less
than the rate of which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in such establish-
ment for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and
responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions, except where
such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (ifi) a sys-
tem which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential
bassed on any other factor other than sex ...
Id § 206(d)(1).
The parallels between the constitutional validity of the EPA and the ADEA are so similar
that they have -often been treated together for purposes of legal comment. See, e.g., Note, Na-
tional League of Cities v. Usery: Its Implicationsfor the Equal Pay Act and the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, 10 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 239, 258-72 (1977). Furthermore, both Acts were
extended to the states through the FLSA Amendments of 1974.
[Vol. 17:782
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late employment decisions and are applicable to state employers
through the FLSA amendments. For no stated reason, the EPA as ap-
plied to the states has not received the same approval among the lower
courts as that enjoyed by the ADEA.41 For example, Howard v. Ward
County,49 in holding the EPA unconstitutional, found that it was
proper to remove states from the definition of "employer" for the pur-
poses of the EPA pursuant to National League of Cities."° Further-
more, the district court in Usery v. Owensboro-Daviess County
Hospitals' refused to engage in a balancing test like that invoked in
Board of Education 2 because the very "balance" relied upon by the
Supreme Court in National League of Cities in declaring the FLSA
amendments invalid would have to be applied to find those same
amendments valid. The court therefore concluded that a balancing test
was not appropriate.- 3 The court further held that analysis of the
EPA's viability under the fourteenth amendment was preempted by the
Supreme Court's ruling in National League of Cities that states are not
considered "employers" for the purposes of the ADEA. "Besides, the
Supreme Court in the League case specifically refused to consider
sources of national power other than the Commerce Clause upon
which the Act and the amendments were premised. 54 Although re-
versed on appeal, the court's reasoning appears equally applicable to a
finding that the ADEA is unconstitutional. In considering the EPA, the
court specifically condemned the fourteenth amendment analysis and
"balancing" test used by the court in Board ofEducation to uphold the
constitutionality of the ADEA as applied to the states.
Both the Owensboro-Daviess County Hospital court and the How-
ard court believed that the National League of Cities decision man-
dated an analysis based solely on the commerce clause. These
decisions are indicative of the difficulty that the lower courts were hav-
ing in justifying the ADEA even before the Supreme Court began to
48. Compare Howard v. Ward County, 418 F. Supp. 494, 501 (D.N.D. 1976) (EPA held un-
constitutional as applied to the states) with Marshall v. Owensboro-Daviess County Hosp., 581
F.2d 116, 120 (6th Cir. 1978); Usery v. Charleston County School Dist., 558 F.2d 1169, 1171-72
(4th Cir. 1977); Usery v. Allegheny County Inst. Dist., 544 F.2d 148, 155-56 (3d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 946 (1977) (cases holding EPA constitutional as applied to the states).
49. 418 F. Supp. 494 (D.N.D. 1976).
50. Id at 500.
51. 423 F. Supp. 843 (W.D. Ky. 1976), rev'd sub non. Marshall v. Owensboro-Daviess
County Hosp., 581 F.2d 116 (6th Cir. 1978).
52. See supra text accompanying notes 42-43.
53. 423 F. Supp. at 84647.
54. Id at 846.
1982]
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undercut the analysis traditionally used to sustain the Act. These
Supreme Court decisions have so amplified the difficulty the lower
courts had with the validity of the ADEA that it now appears the anal-
ysis used by the Owensboro-Daviess County Hospital court is correct.
III. NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES AND THE ADEA
A. The Hodel Requirements
Analysis of the ADEA under the principles asserted in National
League of Cities, coupled with an analysis of recent Supreme Court
decisions, lends credence to the conclusion that the Act is unconstitu-
tional as applied to the states. Such analysis begins with the applica-
tion of the three requirements enunciated in Hodel.55 As demonstrated
below, the ADEA implicates these requirements in a manner forbidden
by both National League of Cities and Hodel.
First, by including the state within its definition of "employer," the
FLSA amendments imposed the ADEA upon state governments in
their traditional capacities, or on the states qua states. Secondly, the
ADEA regulates the employment of state employees, a subject charac-
terized as an indisputable attribute of state sovereignty in National
League of Cities. Finally, the Hodel majority required a showing that
the legislation interfered with a state's ability to structure integral oper-
ations in areas of traditional state functions. Although it is beyond the
scope of this Comment to examine all of the functions that might be
significantly altered by the implementation of the ADEA, a detailed
look at one such example will illustrate the Act's intrusion on state
sovereignty.
An obvious example lies in the realm of education. The delivery
of public education is a traditional governmental function provided by
the states and their political subdivisions.5 6 The operation of the public
school systems would be seriously impaired by the imposition of the
ADEA. Examples of critical budgetary and economic decisions as well
55. See supra text accompanying notes 36-38.
56. The Supreme Court has described education as "perhaps the most important function of
state and local governments." Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) cited with ap-
provalin San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973), and has ranked the
provision of public schools "at the very apex of the functions of a state." Yoder v. Wisconsin, 406
U.S. 205, 213 (1972).
As the most obvious example of how implementation of the ADEA would intrude upon state
sovereignty, the education example provides the greatest support for this author's argument. It is
recognized that a less obvious example, one in which the federal interest is necessarily stronger,
might produce a different result.
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as considered policy choices that would be displaced by the ADEA are
set forth below.
First, using Oklahoma as an example, most school systems have
established a "salary index" method of paying classroom teachers.
This method requires a teacher's salary to be based on his or her years
of teaching experience and the college level degrees attained by the
teacher. With each year's experience within the system, a teacher ob-
tains an increase in salary. Obviously, the great majority of exper-
ienced teachers are going to be older and thus will require a higher
salary upon being hired then their younger counterparts. 7 This fact
could have a significant impact on the employment policies of a school
district that seeks to provide the requisite number of qualified teachers
while staying within its budgetary means. The imposition of the
ADEA on the states would prohibit an employment policy of hiring
younger, less expensive teachers and possibly force school districts to
forego teachers or other needs to comply with federal legislation. This
especially would be true in rural school districts with an insufficient ad
valorem tax base.
Second, Oklahoma statutorily requires school districts to provide
for the educational needs of mentally handicapped, speech-defective,
and emotionally disturbed children. 58 Compliance therewith means
that school districts cannot avoid hiring instructors qualified to teach in
these areas. The higher education levels of these teachers command
higher salaries on the salary index. In order to obtain such instructors,
school districts often hire younger, inexperienced teachers to meet
budgetary requirements. The ADEA would abrogate this policy.
5 9
These are but two of the many employment decisions and prac-
tices made by school boards and legislators in structuring the delivery
of education to their communities. Implementation of the ADEA
would interfere with these decisions and many more, both within and
without the school systems.
57. According to a supplement to the Tulsa Public Schools Personnel Services Handbook
(1981), an incoming employee with a bacculaureate degree and no experience will receive about
$4,000 less than a person with the same degree and six or more years of experience. Since the
Tulsa Public Schools are presently one of the largest employers in Tulsa, Oklahoma, the impact of
hiring a great deal of experienced teachers and administrators would be substantial.
58. OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 13-101 (1971 & Supp. 1980), which provides in part: "[1It shall be
the duty of each school district to provide special education for all exceptional children as herein
defined who reside in that school district."
59. The bona fide occupational qualification of 29 U.S.C. § 623(0 would not excuse these
policies as an exception to the general rule. For discussion, see infra notes 67-77 and accompany-
ing text.
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B. Justice Blackmun's Balancing Approach
Under the balancing approach enunciated by Justice Blackmun in
National League of Cities, federal legislation will be upheld over state
prerogatives even when such legislation usurps state authority in the
manner forbidden by the requirements listed in Hodel, if it can be
shown that the federal interest is demonstrably greater than the state
interest involved." Although Justice Blackmun offered no guidance on
what constituted a sufficient "federal interest" or why commerce clause
analysis demanded such a test, it seems that the competing interests
involved therein were the constitutional principles of federalism and
the national need for the federal legislation. In examining the ADEA
under this test, it is helpful to utilize the guidelines set forth by Justice
Rehnquist in distinguishing Fry from National League of Cities.6 1 Un-
like the ESA, the ADEA was created neither to deal with a national
emergency nor to exist for a limited time span. Furthermore, the
ADEA places burdens on state budgets rather than relieving them as
the ESA was designed to do. Thus the survival of the ADEA appears
dubious under such an analysis. But since it is unlikely that such
guidelines were intended to be comprehensive, evidence of the federal
interest must be found elsewhere.
An apparent inconsistency in federal policy that evidences a lack
of urgency in abrogating age discrimination in state employment can
be found in the recent case of Thomas v. United States Postal Inspection
Service.62 In Thomas, the Tenth Circuit held that in determining the
constitutionality of congressional legislation that provided a mandatory
retirement age of 55 for federal postal inspectors,63 only a "rational
basis" test need be applied." Therefore, the court upheld the validity of
the measure.65 As a result, federal employers are free to. discriminate
on the basis of age so long as there is a rational reason for doing so.
Since the federal government is not included within the definition of
"employer" for the purposes of the ADEA, there is virtually no restric-
60. 426 U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring). See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying
text.
61. See supra text accompanying notes 29-32.
62. 647 F.2d 1035 (10th Cir. 1981).
63. 5 U.S.C. § 8335(b) (1976).
64. 647 F.2d at 1036. See supra text accompanying notes 108-10.
65. The Thomas court believed that not only did the legislation withstand constitutional scru-
tiny, it also made a great deal of sense. "This policy furnishes the Postal Service with a continuous
staff of young, moderately young, and experienced Postal Inspectors. The system is not only a
rational, but a sensible one." Id at 1037.
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tion on the federal government regarding this type of employment dis-
crimination. In contrast, the states are included within the definition of
"employer" in the text of the Act, and the lower courts have unani-
mously upheld the constitutionality of its applicability to the states.
The significance of this inconsistency is that federal policy simultane-
ously commands state compliance with the ADEA while limiting fed-
eral obligations under the Act.66 Under these circumstances it is
difficult to imagine a federal agency urging the ADEA as the answer to
a national need so compelling that state sovereignty must yield. Obvi-
ously, the federal interest is simply not of such magnitude.
Furthermore, in analyzing the scope of the federal interest in abro-
gating age discrimination in state employment it is helpful to compare
the bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) of the ADEA67 with
that of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.68 This comparison
indicates the willingness of the federal government to allow age dis-
crimination as opposed to race and sex discrimination. Since the appli-
cation of title VII to the states has been approved by the Supreme
Court,69 any similarities between title VII and the ADEA would seem
to benefit those urging the constitutionality of the ADEA as applied to
the states. However, a comparison of the BFOQs of the two acts pro-
vides yet another example of how a compelling federal interest in age
discrimination appears to be lacking. The ADEA's BFOQ provides a
defense for those employers accused of age discrimination who can
show the existence of a qualification justifying discrimination reason-
ably necessary to the normal operation of their business.7 ° The BFOQ
66. It is helpful to compare the ADEA to title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976), in examining the federal interest in abrogating age discrimination in
employment. The federal interest in obviating discrimination in employment on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, and national origin was demonstrated with the enactment of title VII. This
interest compelled Congress to extend title VII to state and federal governments by amendment in
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2(1) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), 2000e-16(a) (1976)). The
applicability of title VII to the states was upheld in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 447 (1976).
A comparison of the uniform application of title VII to both state and federal governments with
the ADEA, which is applicable only to the states, indicates a more compelling federal interest in
the principles of title VII than in those of the ADEA.
67. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (1976).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1976), provides in part that it shall be an unlawful employ-
ment practice for an employer "to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compen-
sation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin."
69. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 453 n.9 (1976). "There is no dispute that in enact-
ing the 1972 Amendments to title VII to extend coverage to the States as employers, Congress
exercised its power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment."
70. Although such situations are rare, there are specific examples where the need for the
BFOQ defense might be desirable. One example is the hiring of Blacks for movie parts.
1982]
14
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 17 [1981], Iss. 4, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol17/iss4/6
TULSA LAW JOUR4L
of title VII exists for the same purpose, but is extended as a defense for
discrimination based on religion, sex, or national origin.71 Despite the
inclusion of racial discrimination in the coverage of title VII, "race"
was excluded from the language of the BFOQ. As a result, employers
using race discrimination in employment practices do not enjoy the de-
fense even when it can be shown that discrimination is necessary to the
normal operation of their business. "The omission of the word 'race'
probably was designed to avoid any suggestion that race could be a
valid basis for discrimination. '72 Thus, the federal interest in race dis-
crimination appears greater than that in either sex or age
discrimination.73
Moreover, the courts have more narrowly construed the sex BFOQ
of title VII than the age BFOQ of the ADEA, resulting in substantially
fewer exceptions to the general ban on sex discrimination than on age
discrimination in employment practices. In determining the scope to
be given the sex BFOQ, the Supreme Court in Dothard v. Rawlinson74
stated, "[w]e are persuaded-by the restrictive language of § 703(e), the
relevant legislative history, and the consistent interpretation of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission-that the bfoq exception
was in fact meant to be an extremely narrow exception to the general
prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex." 75 The Court inter-
preted "extremely narrow" to mean that the BFOQ was available to an
employer only where the woman's "sex-as-sex" posed difficulties.
Problems presented by a woman's lack of strength, endurance, and re-
siliency were considered insufficient excuses for invoking the defense.
"Despite the Court's language, it is very unlikely that a construc-
71. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976).
72. Note, Sex as a Bona Fide Occupational Qualification, 1968 UTAH L. REv. 395, 401.
73. The Civil Rights Act's primary impetus was racial discrimination. See Miller, Sex Dis-
crimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 51 MINN. L. REv. 877, 877-80 (1967).
74. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
75. Id at 334 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). The facts of this case are particularly
helpful in determining the Court's definition of "extremely narrow." The Alabama state prison
system issued a regulation barring the employment of women as guards in "contact" positions in
the maximum security prisons. Because of the "rampant violence" and 'jungle atmosphere" in
those prisons, and in particular the random distribution of the 20% of male prisoners who were sex
offenders, a female guard would be especially vulnerable to attack as a woman. Justice Stewart,
writing for the majority, stated, "[Tihe use of women as guards in 'contact' positions under the
existing conditions in the Alabama maximum-security male penitentiaries would pose a substan-
tial security problem, directly linked to the sex of the prison guard." Id at 336. The Alabama
state prison system, then, was relieved of liability not because it could prove that most women
were physically incapable of performing the job, but because it proved that women per se were
incapable of performing the job.
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tion of BFOQ limited to 'age-as-age' will develop."76 Several lower
court rulings have applied a rational basis test in deciding whether dis-
crimination was a necessary element to the operation of a business. 77
Thus, it seems that federal courts are much less willing to allow gender
discrimination than age discrimination in employment practices. A
necessary corollary to this observation is that the federal interest must
be higher in preventing gender discrimination than in preventing age
discrimination and thus the federal interest in the ADEA will not likely
outweigh the state interest when confronted in a balancing test.
Another point illustrating the lack of federal interest in the ADEA
is that the desire to terminate age discrimination in employment prac-
tices was apparently not great enough in 1964 to warrant inclusion in
title VII.7 8 The hesitancy of Congress to include protection for the
aged in the Act is understandable in light of the fact that unemploy-
ment among the aged is traditionally not as high as with the other
groups included in the Act, and indeed, not even as high as the popula-
tion at large. For example, in 1974, the year the ADEA was extended
to the states, the unemployment rate for the entire labor force was
4.9%.79 Comparing this statistic with the percentage of those unem-
ployed in the 40-65 age bracket, 2-3%, it becomes obvious that in enact-
ing the ADEA, Congress was not combatting an unemployment
problem at all. In contrast, in the years just prior to the enactment of
title VII, non-whites, the group providing the impetus for the enact-
ment of the Act, made up approximately 11% of the civilian work force,
but constituted approximately 22% of the unemployed." These statis-
76. 3 A. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: RACE, AGE, RELIGION, HANDICAP AND
OTHER § 100.12, at 21-51 (1981).
77. See, e.g., Martin v. Tamaki, 607 F.2d 307, 309 (9th Cir. 1979) (compulsory retirement
system for city employees was found to be rationally related to legitimate objectives); Usery v.
Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 238 (5th Cir. 1976) (bus company allowed great discre-
tion in determining safety standards which justified company policy of refusing to consider appli-
cations of individuals between 40 and 65 for employment as bus drivers); Hodgson v. Greyhound
Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859, 865 (7th Cir. 1974) (intercity bus carrier, in utilizing the BFOQ to justify
policy of not considering applicants over 35, required only to show that a rational basis existed for
belief that termination of this policy would increase likelihood of risk of harm to passengers).
78. As a result of Congress' failure to include protection for the aged in title VII, some courts
have refused to be guided by the law applicable to title VII cases, choosing instead to look to the
ADEA's own unique history. See, e.g., Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 312 (6th Cir.
1975) ("That the law is embodied in a separate act and has its own unique history at least counsel
the examiner to consider the particular problems sought to be reached by the statute.").
79. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS 21-
22 (1974).
80. For a detailed breakdown of the unemployment statistics for 1962, see 1964 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2513-14.
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tics clearly demonstrate the compelling need for legislation protecting
non-whites from discrimination in employment.
Similarly, the 1974 statistics illustrate the questionable need for the
ADEA as opposed to legislation which is designed to meet a compel-
ling national need such as the ESA in Fry.8 1 Absent such a need, it is
difficult to envision the ADEA surviving the National League of Cities
balancing test in which national and state interests are pitted against
one another. As a result, it is very unlikely that the ADEA can be
validly imposed on the states pursuant to Congress' commerce power.
Therefore, analysis of the ADEA is reduced to an investigation of its
validity as enacted pursuant to the enforcement power of the four-
teenth amendment.
IV. THE ADEA AND THE ENFORCEMENT POWER OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
As previously stated, the majority of the lower courts that have
reviewed the application of the ADEA to the states have recognized the
analytical difficulties presented by sustaining the Act under the com-
merce power and instead have chosen to analogize the Act to title VII,
which was enacted pursuant to the enforcement provision of the four-
teenth amendment.82 The substantive provisions of this amendment
"are by express terms directed at the States."83 The Supreme Court has
long recognized a shift in federal/state relations on fourteenth amend-
ment issues that allows federal interests to impose on traditional state
prerogatives.8 4 The question, then, is what limitations exist on Con-
gress' power to enact legislation under the enforcement provision?
A. Congressional Power under Morgan
Congressional power under the enforcement provision is "plenary
within the terms of the constitutional grant."8 5 However, legislation
that does not "enforce, by appropriate legislation" the provisions of the
equal protection clause may not be justified by the power granted in
81. See supra text accompanying notes 29-32.
82. See supra notes 66-73 and accompanying text.
83. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 453 (1976).
84. See Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 179 (1980); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112,
134 (1970); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 658 (1966); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745,
759 (1966); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 325 (1966); Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S.
339, 370 (1880).
85. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).
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section 5 of the amendment.8 6 Inquiry into which branch of govern-
ment has the authority to recognize those rights inherent in the equal
protection clause necessarily begins with Marbury v. Madison,87 which
recognized the power of the judiciary to disregard legislation when it is
found to conflict with the Constitution.88
A broad reading of Marbury suggests the Supreme Court is the
ultimate interpreter of the ConStitution, with congressional activity lim-
ited by the bounds of that interpretation. The majority in Cooper v.
Aaron89 adopted such a reading, asserting that "the federal judiciary is
supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution."9 However,
as the issue remains unresolved, one queries "whether, consistent with
the concept of judicial review assumed in Marbury and subsequently
developed, the Supreme Court can itself tolerate interpretations of the
Constitution other than its own, even in cases where it has jurisdiction
to review." 9' With regard to the equal protection clause, if the Court
indeed possesses such ultimate authority, the ability of Congress to leg-
islate on the rights contained within the clause is contingent upon pre-
vious judicial recognition of those rights.
However, in 1966 the Court in South Carolina v. Katzenbach92 laid
a foundation that enabled Congress to fashion its own remedies in the
terms of those acknowledged rights. Writing for the majority, Chief
Justice Warren stated:
We. . . reject South Carolina's argument that Congress may
appropriately do no more than to forbid violations of the Fif-
86. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
87. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 368 (1803).
88. Justice Marshall stated:
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.
Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret
that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of
each. So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the constitution
apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case conformably to
the law, disregarding the constitution, or conformably to the constitution, disregarding
the law, the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This
is the very essence of judicial duty.
If, then, the courts are to regard the constitution, and the constitution is superior to
any ordinary act of the legislature, the constitution, and no such ordinary act, must gov-
ern the case to which they both apply.
Id at 389.
89. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
90. Id at 18.
91. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-4, at 28 (1978).
92. 383 U.S. 301 (1966). Although the Court in Katzenbach was dealing with the enforce-
ment provision of the fifteenth amendment, U.S. CONsT. amend. XV, § 2, the analysis is the same
as that used in fourteenth amendment cases.
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teenth Amendment in general terms-that the task of fashion-
ing specific remedies or of applying them to particular
localities must necessarily be left entirely to the courts. Con-
gress is not circumscribed by any such artificial rules under
§ 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment.93
The Court limited this new recognition of congressional power by for-
bidding Congress to overstep its constitutional bounds by attacking
problems not comprehended by the fourteenth or fifteenth amend-
ments.94 To this point, then, Congress was still restricted to enforcing
the amendment in accordance with terms recognized by the courts.
A further broadening of Congress' ability to enforce the fourteenth
amendment came in Katzenbach v. Morgan,9" in which the Court up-
held a provision of the Voting Rights Act of 196596 which mandated
that those persons who had completed the sixth grade in a school that
instructed in a language other than English could not be denied the
right to vote because of an inability to speak English.97 Justice Bren-
nan, writing for the majority, initially sustained the Act on grounds
that Congress might have viewed the removal of a New York voting
prerequisite of English literacy as a measure adapted to protecting Pu-
erto Ricans from unconstitutional discrimination.9" However, in a sec-
ond branch of the opinion, Justice Brennan recognized the authority of
Congress to enact legislation based on its own constitutional determi-
nations, even though they might substantively conflict with the findings
of the Court.99 In doing so, Justice Brennan stated, "we perceive a ba-
sis upon which Congress might predicate a judgment that the applica-
tion of New York's English literacy requirement . . . constituted an
93. Id at 327.
94. Id at 326-27. In providing this limitation, the Court reaffirmed United States v. Reese,
92 U.S. 214 (1875), and James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127 (1902). In Reese, the Court considered a
statute providing punishment for any person who by force, bribery, threats, etc., hindered,
delayed, or obstructed any citizen from voting. The Court held this statute unconstitutional be-
cause it punished offenders who wrongfully refused voters on grounds other than the voter's race,
color, or previous conditions of servitude. 92 U.S. at 218. In James, congressional legislation
enacted pursuant to the enforcement provisions of the fifteenth amendment was struck down on
grounds that it sought to provide sanctions against an individual and did not comport with the
state action limitations of the amendment. 190 U.S. at 139-40.
95. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
96. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e) (1976).
97. 384 U.S. at 657-58.
98. Id at 652-53.
99. In a footnote, Justice Brennan claimed that congressional power under section 5 was
limited to the enforcement of the guarantees of the amendment, and as such, Congress had no
power to restrict or dilute these guarantees. 384 U.S. at 651 n.10. At first glance, this statement
seems to limit congressional authority. However, it becomes somewhat ambiguous upon the reali-
zation that the expansion of one group's rights necessarily contracts the rights of another.
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invidious discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause.""°
The second branch of the Morgan rationale, which indicates that
Congress can make substantive changes in the constitutional findings of
the Court, undoubtedly calls for a reevaluation of the basic principles
established in Marbury. However, since the Court dictated its holding
in the first branch of its opinion, the weight to be given to the latter part
of the opinion in future decisions is unclear. 0 1
The greatest guidance in interpreting Morgan came in the later
case of Oregon v. Mitchell.102 There a splintered Court concluded that
the 18-year-old provisions of the Voting Rights Acts Amendments of
1970103 were valid as applied to federal elections, but could not be im-
posed on the states in state elections.10 Despite the lack of a majority
opinion, five justices asserted that congressional authority to recognize
the right to vote among 18-year-olds in all elections, federal and state,
did not exist. This substantially undercut the Morgan rationale that
allowed Congress the power to give substantive content to the meaning
of due process and equal protection. As a result, limitations on con-
gressional power under the enforcement provision remained unclear.
Such lack of clarity prompted one legal commentator to describe
the situation as "a constitutional law disaster area."' 15 Nevertheless,
certain conclusions can be drawn regarding the effect of Oregon on
Morgan. It seems that if indeed congressional substantive interpreta-
tion exists at all, the Court is more willing to defer to Congress on
100. 384 U.S. at 656. This conclusion allowed congressional findings to fly in the face of
principles established in Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959),
wherein a unanimous Court held that, absent the intention to use literacy tests to pepetuate dis-
crimination, such tests were not unconstitutional. Id at 53.
101. Professor Cox interprets Morgan to mean that Congress possesses superiority over the
Supreme Court as a fact finder only. See Cox, Foreword- Constitutional Ad/udication and the
Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REv. 91, 104 (1966); Cox, The Role of Congress in
Constitutional Determinations ,40 U. Cir. L. REV. 199, 229-30 (1971). In this sense, Morgan is
"neither more nor less a radical decision than South Carolina v. Katzbenbach." L. TRIBE, AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-14, at 268 (1978).
102. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
103. Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.
(1976)).
104. Justices Stewart, Burger, Blackmun, and Harlan concluded that Congress had no author-
ity in either state or federal elections to confer the right to vote on 18 to 21-year-olds because only
the states had the power to set voting qualifications. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and
Douglas concluded that Congress had such authority in both federal and state elections. Justice
Black believed that Congress could confer such voting privileges in federal elections, but had no
authority to mandate such requirements in state elections.
105. Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 603, 609 (1975).
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matters concerning racial discrimination, 10 6 a category traditionally
given heightened scrutiny, than on matters of discrimination towards
groups not yet established as "discreet and insular minorities." 10 7 As
stated by Justice Black, "the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment [was not] intended to permit Congress to prohibit every
discrimination between groups of people. On the other hand, the Civil
War Amendments were unquestionably designed to condemn and for-
bid every distinction, however trifling, on account of race."10 8
Significantly, Justice Black was the only member of the Oregon
Court to allow "race" to figure into his analysis. The other justices
based their decisions on rigid principles applicable to all situations re-
gardless of the group alleging a violation of equal protection. But the
mandate of Oregon is clear-Congress does not have the power to di-
rect states to confer the right to vote on 18 to 21-year-olds based on a
finding that such group is being denied equal protection. As a result, if
Congress is left with any power to impose legislation on the states
through its independent substantive interpretation of section 1 of the
fourteenth amendment, the boundaries of that power must be defined
through factual differences between Morgan and Oregon. The most
obvious difference is that Morgan addressed racial discrimination and
Oregon did not. Justice Black, the only justice who seriously sought to
distinguish the two cases, pointed to race as the distinguishing factor.
If Congress is indeed void of power to independently interpret
substantive rights contained in the fourteenth amendment (at least
outside of the racial context, as indicated by Oregon), then the ADEA
is unconstitutional absent a showing that it was a remedy designed to
enforce a fundamental right implicit in the fourteenth amendment. In
other words, for the ADEA to withstand constitutional challenge, the
Court must either conclude that Congress may substantively interpret
the fourteenth amendment in areas outside of "race," or alternatively,
that the ADEA is only a remedy fashioned in terms of rights already
recognized by the Court.
In examining the authority of Congress to substantively interpret
the fourteenth amendment, it is necessary to analyze two recent
Supreme Court decisions addressing the issue. City ofRome v. United
106. Professor Cohen disagrees with this observation and contends that the cases cannot be
reconciled on the grounds that Morgan involved racial discrimination in voting and Oregon did
not. See id at 617.
107. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (plurality opinion).
108. 400 U.S. at 127 (opinion of Black, J.).
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States 1 9 and Fullilove v. Klutznick 1 ° both addressed racial discrimina-
tion, and both stopped short of invoking the second branch of the
Court's rationale in Morgan ." The Court in Rome examined portions
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and concluded that Congress was act-
ing under its "remedial" powers in prohibiting changes in the City of
Rome's voting system that would have a disparate discriminatory im-
pact on Negroes' voting power.112 The majority held that since only
intentional discrimination in legislation had been determined by the
Court to be a violation of the Constitution, 13 Congress must have con-
cluded that in order to enforce the ban on intentional discrimination, it
was necessary to prohibit legislation having a discriminatory effect." 4
In so ruling, the Court appeared to treat the congressional enforcement
power as a "remedial" power broad enough to go beyond explicit find-
ings of the Court but not so broad as to directly conflict with them or to
create new constitutional rights.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Rehnquist recognized that the ma-
109. 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
110. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
111. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
112. 446 U.S. at 177-78.
113. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 (1977) (nonprofit
developer failed to prove discriminatory intent or purpose on the part of a planning commission
which refused to rezone a single-family district to a multi-family district in order to make way for
a racially integrated housing proposal); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 245-49 (1976) (two
Black police officers failed to prove discriminatory intent or purpose on the part of municipal
officers who implemented a personnel test to ascertain whether police recruits had acquired a
particular level of verbal skill); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 549 (1972) (in alleging a dis-
proportionately large number of minority groups in a welfare program for families with depen-
dent children, appellants failed to demonstrate discriminatory intent or purpose in a system that
provided fewer funds for this program than for other assistance programs); Palmer v. Thompson,
403 U.S. 217,226-27 (1971) (Black citizens failed to prove discriminatory intent or purpose on part
of city council which closed several city-owned pools rather than operate them on an integrated
basis); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886) (Chinese laundry owners proved discrimina-
tory intent on part of municipal authorities who enacted an ordinance which gave arbitrary power
to municipal officers to give or deny consent for the establishment of public laundries); Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 309-10 (1879) (Black defendant demonstrated discriminatory intent
present in enacting West Virginia laws that made Blacks ineligible for both grand and petit jury
service); see also Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 281 (1979) (requiring that discrimina-
tory purpose be proved in an equal protection claim involving "gender").
114. 446 U.S. at 177. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), the Court construed
title VII to prohibit an employer from subjecting prospective employees to an intelligence test
when the effect was to disadvantage black applicants. The Court ruled that "Congress directed
the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation." Id
at 432 (emphasis in original). However, the Court in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976),
reaffirmed the premise that the Constitution still required proof of discriminatory intent to uphold
an equal protection claim. Id at 239 ("[O]ur cases have not embraced the proposition that a law
or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is
unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact.") (emphasis in original).
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jority limited the congressional enforcement power to fashioning broad
remedies for specific rights, but insisted that in this case Congress had
gone beyond its remedial power in determining that an enforcement of
the constitutional ban on intentionally discriminatory legislation re-
quired the prohibition of voting structures having a disparate impact
on racial minorities. According to Justice Rehnquist, this congressional
conclusion worked to "create a code of municipal law for the regula-
tion of private rights" more than it worked to "provide modes of re-
dress against the operation of State laws [which] are subversive of the
fundamental rights specified in the [a]mendment."' l l Thus, both the
majority and dissenting opinions recognized Congress' enforcement
power as remedial only, with the Justices disagreeing only on whether,
under these facts, Congress had exceeded the bounds of this power.
The Court in Fullilove also implied that the congressional enforce-
ment power was no more than remedial in nature. In upholding the
constitutional validity of the "minority business enterprise" provision
of the Public Works Employment Act of 1977,116 the majority held that
Congress had acted properly in concluding that "minority business
[had] been denied effective participation in public contracting opportu-
nities by procurement practices that perpetuated the effects of prior dis-
crimination." '117 Thus, the provision was found to be an appropriate
remedy for enforcing the fourteenth amendment's prohibition against
purposeful discrimination.118
While these decisions do not explicitly overrule the second branch
of the Morgan decision, their unwillingness to recognize the congres-
sional enforcement power as anything but remedial indicates that Con-
gress' power to substantively interpret rights in the fourteenth
amendment is nonexistent. Furthermore, since both of these cases
dealt with racial discrimination, it appears that, contrary to the second
branch of the Court's holding in Morgan, Congress probably does not
have the power to substantively interpret the amendment even in a ra-
cial context. If indeed that is the case, congressional power to enact the
115. 446 U.S. at 220 (quoting the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883)).
116. Pub. L. 95-28, 91 Stat. 116 (1977) (amending the Local Public Works Capital Develop-
ment and Investment Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6701-6710 (1976)). The provision requires that,
absent an administrative waiver, at least 10% of federal funds granted for local public works
projects must be used to procure services or supplies from businesses owned by minority group
members, defined as United States citizens "who are Negroes, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indi-
ans, Eskimos and Aleuts."
117. 448 U.S. at 477-78.
118. Id at 478.
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ADEA must hinge on whether there is a judicially acknowledged right
implied in the equal protection clause capable of being enforced
through remedial legislation.
B. Congress' Remedial Power Under the Enforcement Clause
Title VII provides a helpful analogy in analyzing whether the
ADEA is a valid remedy for a right implicit in the fourteenth amend-
ment. Most of the lower courts finding the ADEA constitutional' 19
compared the ADEA to title VII and concluded that the common ob-
jective of the acts, eliminating employment discrimination, 120 indicated
that the ADEA had been passed under the enforcement power of the
fourteenth amendment just as title VII was. A closer look reveals the
error in this analysis.
Title VII was enacted to deal with employment discrimination in
the areas of race and gender, both of which have received heightened
scrutiny' 21 in constitutional analysis by the Supreme Court. 122 In other
words, any state legislation discriminating on account of race or gender
will be struck down absent a showing by the state that the legislation is
tailored to implement important state interests. 123 Legislation discrimi-
119. See supra note 12.
120. See, e.g., Usery v. Board of Educ., 421 F. Supp. 718 (D. Utah 1976).
In light of the similar statutory and constitutional objectives of Title VII and Section
623(a) of the ADEA to prohibit arbitrary and discriminatory employment criteria based
on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or age and in the absence of a clear expres-
sion by Congress in the ADEA of the constitutional foundation for this legislation in the
Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment, this court interprets the ADEA's age
discrimination limitations on state employers in 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(a) (1975) as constitu-
tionally permissible under either the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id at 721.
121. "[S]trict scrutiny acknowledges that ... political choices. . . burdening fundamental
rights, or suggesting prejudice against racial or other minorities-must be subjected to close analy-
sis in order to preserve substantive values of equality and liberty." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW § 16-6, at 1000 (1978). "Heightened scrutiny" is the term used in this Comment to
indicate a standard between that of minimum rationality and strict scrutiny. Although race re-
ceives strict scrutiny in equal protection analysis, see, e.g., Hunter v. Erickson, 393 US. 385 (1969),
gender has been given a "middle tier" analysis somewhere between strict scrutiny and minimum
rationality, see, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
122. Title VII also prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of religion. However,
constitutional analysis of religious discrimination is usually reviewed under the first amendment's
"free exercise" clause where religion receives its own form of "heightened scrutiny.' See, e.g.,
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406-09 (1963) (heightened scrutiny utilized to invalidate a South
Carolina decision denying appellant, a Seventh Day Adventist, employment benefits for failure to
take available employment subsequent to discharge for failure to work on Saturday, the day of
Sabbath, because of similarity of available employment). Therefore, this Comment's equal pro-
tection analysis of the groups protected by title VII and the ADEA does not include religious
minorities.
123. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITIONAL LAW §§ 16-6, 16-13, 16-14 (1978).
24
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 17 [1981], Iss. 4, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol17/iss4/6
TULSA LAW JOUPV4L
nating against a class that has not benefited from the Court's height-
ened scrutiny must be only rationally related to the ends being sought.
Utilization of this rational basis test by the Court usually indicates that
the indicted legislation will be upheld as not violative of the equal pro-
tection clause. 124
Thus, if title VII was enacted by Congress to combat race and gen-
der employment discrimination, and the Court gives race and gender
heightened scrutiny under the fourteenth amendment, then title VII as
applied to the states is legislation designed to prevent acts that also
constitute equal protection violations. However, if, unlike the race and
gender classifications within title VII, the classification within the
ADEA is not entitled to any heightened scrutiny under the equal pro-
tection clause, then the ADEA is granting rights not found in the Con-
stitution. As was previously discussed, Congress apparently lacks the
authority to substantively interpret the fourteenth amendment in-
dependent of the courts. Thus, it becomes important to determine
whether age discrimination is entitled to heightened scrutiny. If it is
not, then Congress clearly overstepped its bounds in enacting the
ADEA.
Examples of the Court's treatment of the aged under the equal
protection clause can be found in Massachusetts Board of Retirement v.
Murgia125 and Vance v. Bradley.'26  In both cases the Court asserted
that age discrimination was not entitled to heightened scrutiny, apply-
ing instead a rational basis test. The Court in Massachusetts Board of
Retirement found that employment discrimination by local govern-
ments violated neither a fundamental right 127 nor required heightened
scrutiny for purposes of equal protection analysis.'28 With specific ref-
erence to discrimination based'on age, the Court stated:
While the treatment of the aged in this Nation has not been
wholly free of discrimination, such persons, unlike, say, those
124. Id § 16-24.
125. 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
126. 440 U.S. 93 (1979).
127. The other strand of equal protection analysis concerns state infringment on fundamental
rights. If legislative or administrative classifications result in inequalities of rights fundamental to
the Constitution (i.e., the receipt of welfare benefits, see, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,
631-33 (1969)), then the courts will apply strict scrutiny to the classification. Thus, an elderly
person might claim a violation of equal protection of his fundamental right of employment and
demand that strict scrutiny be applied to a state policy or law that discriminates against the elderly
in employment decisions. However, the Court has inferred that the right to employment is not
"fundamental" for equal protection purposes. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87
(1970).
128. 427 U.S. at 312-13.
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who have been discriminated against on the basis of race or
national origin, have not experienced a "history of purposeful
unequal treatment" or been subjected to unique disabilities
on the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative
of their abilities.' 2 9
The principles established in Massachusetts Board of Retirement
were affirmed in Vance. There the Court held that section 1002 of the
Foreign Service Act of 1946,130 which mandated retirement at age sixty
for participants in the Foreign Service Retirement System,13 ' was not
unconstitutional as reviewed under a rational basis test.' 32 The Court
emphasized that Congress' intent was not to punish the aged by re-
warding "youth qua youth," but rather to "stimulat[e] the highest per-
formance in the ranks of the Foreign Service by assuring that
opportunities for promotion would be available."' 33  The Court felt
that superior achievement was a legitimate goal under the rational ba-
sis test.
As these two cases clearly demonstrate that the aged are not a
group in need of heightened scrutiny under the equal protection clause,
Congress could not have been enforcing the fourteenth amendment
when it enacted the ADEA. Only by unilaterally creating a new consti-
tutional right for the aged could Congress validly claim that the Act
enforces the fourteenth amendment. Since recent case law indicates
that Congress has no power to independently create such rights,' 34 con-
gressional constitutional authority to enact the ADEA under the en-
forcement power of the fourteenth amendment is doubtful. 31
C. Congress' Ability to Utilize the Enforcement Power After
Pennhurst
After National League of Cities, there was some speculation in the
lower courts of whether analysis of Congress' "enforcement" power
129. Id at 313.
130. 22 U.S.C. §§ 801-1204 (1976 & Supp. 1980).
131. Participation in the Foreign Service Retirement System is defined in 22 U.S.C. § 4043
(Supp. IV 1980).
132. 440 U.S. at 108-09.
133. Id. at 101.
134. See supra notes 102-18 and accompanying text.
135. The preceding analysis concludes that Congress had no authority to enact the ADEA.
Thus, Congress could not validly impose the Act on either the states or the private sector by
enforcing the fourteenth amendment. It must be remembered, however, that Congress can prop-
erly rely on the commerce power in enacting legislation applicable to the private sector because in
that situation federalism does not act as an external constraint.
19821
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was appropriate in reviewing the ADEA and the EPA.136 The district
court in Owensboro-Daviess County Hospital'37 asserted that such anal-
ysis was improper because in National League of Cities the Supreme
Court reviewed the viability of the FLSA amendments solely under the
commerce clause upon which the amendments were specifically pre-
mised. 3 ' Similarly, the district court felt that the EPA, which was also
enacted pursuant to the commerce clause, should be reviewed solely
under commerce clause analysis.
In reversing the district court, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
asserted that "[tihe absence of any express reference to the Fourteenth
Amendment in the 1974 amendments is of no consequence. It was not
necessary for Congress to expressly rely on § 5 in exercising its power
because such power clearly existed."' 39 The appellate court found sup-
port for this statement in Morgan where the Supreme Court insisted
that its only duty in reviewing the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was to
"perceive a basis upon which the Congress might resolve the conflict as
it did. ' 140 The Sixth Circuit then upheld the EPA as a proper exercise
of the enforcement power of the fifteenth amendment. 14
The question of whether legislation should be reviewed under the
enforcement power absent a specific statement by Congress of reliance
on the power in enacting the legislation was again presented to the
Court in Pennhurst State School v. Halderman.142 There the majority
held that in deciding whether a portion of the Developmentally Dis-
abled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975143 was enacted pursu-
ant to the spending power or the enforcement power, the spending
power should be assumed to prevail in the absence of stated congres-
sional intent. The Court reasoned, "[b]ecause. . .legislation [enacted
under the enforcement power] imposes congressional policy on a State
involuntarily, and because it often intrudes on traditional state author-
136. For a discussion of the constitutionality of the EPA and its implications on the ADEA,
see supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
137. 423 F. Supp. 843 (W.D. Ky. 1976), rev'd sub non Marshall v. Owensboro-Daviess
County Hosp., 581 F.2d 116 (6th Cir. 1978).
138. 1d at 846.
139. 581 F.2d 116, 120 (6th Cir. 1978); accord Usery v. Allegheny County Inst. Dist., 544 F.2d
148, 155 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 946 (1977).
140. 384 U.S. at 653 (1966). The issue whether Congress must specifically rely on the enforce-
ment power to utilize it was not specifically raised in Morgan. The Voting Rights Act of 1965
explicitly relies on the enforcement power in the text of the Act.
141. 581 F.2d at 119-20.
142. 101 S. Ct. 1531 (1981).
143. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6081 (1976).
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ity, we should not quickly attribute to Congress an unstated intent to
act under its authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment."'" Fur-
thermore, Justice White, in an opinion joined by Justices Brennan and
Marshall that dissented in part, agreed with the majority that "it should
not be lightly assumed that Congress acted pursuant to its power under
§ 5 in passing the Act," '145 and added that, before legislation would be
attributed to the enforcement power, a "conclusive basis" for such a
determination had to be shown. 146 Thus, a unanimous Court agreed
that absent explicit statements of congressional intent, legislation
should not be linked to the enforcement power.
In light of Pennhurst, then, analysis of the ADEA under the four-
teenth amendment enforcement power is incorrect absent an explicit
finding of congressional reliance on such power in its enactment of the
FLSA amendments. As indicated earlier, the ADEA specifically refers
to the commerce clause.147 There is no legislative history indicating an
intent to invoke the authority of section 5 nor any congressional find-
ings that employment discrimination by state and local governments on
account of age violates the equal protection clause.' 48 In addition, the
FLSA amendments were conclusively construed to have been enacted
solely under the commerce clause in NationalLeagues of Cities.'4 9 As a
result, the Court's decision in Pennhurst preempts analysis of the con-
stitutional validity of the ADEA under section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment.
V. CONCLUSION
Two district court cases, EEOC v. Wyoming,' 5° presently on ap-
peal to the Supreme Court, and Taylor v. Dept. ofFish & Game of Mon-
tana,'51 currently stand as the sole judicial support for the conclusion
that the ADEA as applied to the states is unconstitutional. However, as
the only courts to address the issue in light of recent Supreme Court
decisions, they deserve considerable deference. Indeed, earlier deci-
144. 101 S. Ct. at 1539.
145. Id at 1549 (White, J., dissenting in part).
146. Id
147. See supra notes 5 & 6 and accompanying text.
148. A finding by Congress that the ADEA was enacted pursuant to the enforcement power
seems especially important in light of the fact that the ADEA, unlike the statute in Pennhurst, is
arguably not enforcing any right inherent in the Constitution.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 20-22.
150. 514 F. Supp. 595 (D. Wyo. 1981),prob.juris noted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3547 (Jan. 11, 1982).
151. 523 F. Supp. 514 (D. Mont. 1981).
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sions affirming the ADEA's validity as applied to the states must now
be viewed as the product of obsolete constitutional law.
The decision handed down in EEOC v. Wyoming is analytically
correct in holding that congressional power to rely on the enforcement
clause in enacting the ADEA is wholly lacking. Additionally, judicial
review of the ADEA under the enforcement power is preempted by
Congress' failure to explicitly and conclusively attribute the enactment
of the ADEA to section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. If the ADEA
was not, therefore, enacted pursuant to the enforcement power, judicial
review must be based on congressional power under the commerce
clause.
Commerce clause analysis indicates that just as the minimum
wage and maximum hour provisions of the FLSA amendments inter-
fered with essential state functions and infringed on state sovereignty,
so does the ADEA. Furthermore, the federal government has demon-
strated that its interest in abrogating employment discrimination to-
wards the aged is not sufficiently vital to outweigh the states' interest in
performing their traditional sovereign functions. These facts, coupled
with the recent evolution in constitutional law, indicate that sustaining
the validity of the ADEA as applied to the states would require refuting
existing constitutional doctrine.
James Michael Love
[Vol. 17:782
29
Love: The Unconstitutionality of the Age Discrimination in Employment A
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1981
